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If we are going to have a treaty about migratory birds, let us have
some place where they can come and remain safely and be a pleasure
1
and companions.
Nobody is trying to do anything here except to keep pothunters from
killing game out of season, ruining the eggs of nesting birds, and
2
ruining the country by it.
One of the first federal wildlife protection statutes, the Migratory
3
Bird Treaty Act of 1918 (MBTA), remains relatively unchanged over
4
eighty-five years after its enactment. Threats to migratory birds,
however, have changed dramatically. Concerns about overexploit5
ation of birds prompted the MBTA’s passage, but habitat destruction
6
is responsible for the current biodiversity crisis. Indeed, more than
7
1200 species are facing extinction in the United States, and habitat
destruction is a contributing factor for more than ninety-five percent
8
of these imperiled species. Of the more than 800 species of native
birds in the United States, 67 are federally listed as endangered or
threatened, and “[a]n additional 184 are species of conservation
concern because of their small distribution, high threats, or declining
9
populations.”
1. 56 CONG. REC. 7458 (1918) (statement of Rep. Smith).
2. 55 CONG. REC. 4816 (1917) (statement of Sen. Smith).
3. 16 U.S.C. § 703–712 (2006).
4. See infra notes 40–53.
5. See infra Section I.A.
6. GARY K. MEFFE & C. RONALD CARROLL, PRINCIPLES OF CONSERVATION BIOLOGY
148 (2d ed. 1997).
7. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., SPECIES REPORTS: SUMMARY OF LISTED SPECIES
LISTED POPULATIONS AND RECOVERY PLANS, http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/
TESSBoxscore (last visited on Apr. 18, 2010).
8. KIM DELFINO, A JOINT REPORT FROM U.S. PIRG AND SIERRA CLUB, WILDLIFE
NEEDS WILD PLACES: THE STATE OF DISAPPEARING SPECIES AND THEIR HABITAT 10 (1997).
9. NORTH AMERICAN BIRD CONSERVATION INITIATIVE, U.S. COMMITTEE, ET AL., THE
STATE OF THE BIRDS: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 4 (2009), available at
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Current environmental laws provide some protection for wildlife
10
habitat. The National Forest Management Act requires the United
States Forest Service to retain a diversity of plant communities in
11
national forests. This statute provides no protection for wildlife on
private lands, however, and protection of wildlife on public lands
12
often takes a backseat to timber and other consumptive uses. The
Endangered Species Act (ESA) protects habitat for threatened and
13
endangered species, but this protection often comes too late to
14
enable species recovery. Consequently, environmentalists are trying
to find new tools to protect wildlife habitat.
In the past decade, the MBTA has received some attention from
environmental law scholars and practitioners hoping to breathe new
15
life into this relatively ignored statute. Indeed, the MBTA has the
potential to be a powerful tool for addressing biodiversity loss. Its
expansive language provides protection for more than 800 species of
16
migratory birds on public and private lands. Importantly, the MBTA
protects species before they become threatened or endangered. As
such, it is well-suited to fill the gaps left by other environmental laws.
This paper analyzes the MBTA’s capacity to protect wildlife habitat. Part I provides an overview of the MBTA, including the context of
its passage, its major provisions, and its modest evolution since 1918.
Part II summarizes case law interpreting the MBTA in the context of
habitat destruction. Part III critically examines the MBTA’s text,
legislative history, purpose, and prior applications and argues that the
statute should be interpreted to protect bird habitat. Recognizing
that the judiciary has been reluctant to give the MBTA this interpretation, the paper concludes by calling for legislative reform.

http://www.stateofthebirds.org/pdf_files/State_of_the_Birds_2009.pdf.
10. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600–1614 (2006).
11. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B) (2006).
12. See Elizabeth Losos, et al., Taxpayer-Subsidized Resource Extraction Harms Species,
45 BIOSCIENCE 446 (1995).
13. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533, 1536 (2006) (prohibiting federal agencies from adversely
modifying critical habitat and prohibiting significant habitat modification or
degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife).
14. Scott Finet, Habitat Protection and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 10 TUL. ENVTL.
L.J. 1, 19 n.82 (1996).
15. See Benjamin Means, Prohibiting Conduct, Not Consequences: The Limited Reach of
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 97 MICH. L. REV. 823, 823, n.2 (1998).
16. 50 C.F.R. § 10.13 (2009).
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I. THE MBTA’S ENACTMENT, MAJOR PROVISIONS, AND MODEST
EVOLUTION
A. Congress Passed the MBTA in Response to a Decline in Migratory
Birds
Mass destruction of birds for food, sport, and millinery purposes
17
occurred at the end of the nineteenth century. Several species went
18
extinct, including the passenger pigeon. In response to the decline
of birds, a bird protection movement formed that sought to achieve
19
legal protections for migratory birds.
The MBTA is the most
20
important result of these efforts.
The MBTA gave effect to a treaty signed between the United
States and Great Britain on behalf of Canada for the protection of
21
migratory birds (hereinafter “Canadian Convention”). In a letter to
President Woodrow Wilson urging his approval of the treaty, Secretary
of State Robert Lansing summarized the concerns that motivated the
treaty negotiations:
Not very many years ago vast numbers of waterfowl and shorebirds nested within the limits of the United States . . . but
the extension of agriculture, and particularly the draining
on a large scale of swamps and meadows, together with improved firearms and a vast increase in the number of
sportsmen, have so altered conditions that comparatively few
22
migratory game birds nest within our limits.
This loss of game birds concerned hunters dependent on the
17. See Finet, supra note 14, at 6 n.15.
18. See George Cameron Coggins & Sebastian T. Patti, The Resurrection and
Expansion of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 50 U. COLO. L. REV. 165, 168 (1979) (citing P.
MATTHEISSEN, WILDLIFE IN AMERICA (1959)).
19. See Finet, supra note 14, at 6 n.15.
20. Congress’s first attempt to protect migratory birds was the 1913 McLeanWeeks Act of March 4, 1913, ch. 145, 37 Stat. 828, 847 (repealed 1918). It was
declared invalid in multiple federal court rulings as beyond Congress’s power.
United States v. Shauver, 214 F. 154 (E.D. Ark. 1914); United States v. McCullagh, 221
F. 288 (D. Kan. 1915). A date for oral argument was set before the United States
Supreme Court, but the case was not heard because Secretary of State Robert Lansing
avoided the issue by negotiating a treaty with Canada and invoking the treaty power as
the constitutional authority for the MBTA. See Coggins & Patti, supra note 18, at 169.
The United States Supreme Court later upheld the MBTA as a valid use of the treaty
power. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
21. Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, U.S.-Gr. Brit. (on behalf of
Canada), Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702, T.S. No. 628.
22. United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1080–
81 (D. Colo. 1999) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 65-243, at 2 (1918)).
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birds for their sport, but the Canadian Convention also offered
23
protection for non-game birds. Concern for non-game birds came
from farmers who wanted protection for birds that feed on insects
24
injurious to crops. In addition, the government recognized aesthetic
interests in birds, and that many Americans “have happy memories of
their homes made brighter and more attractive by the annual
25
visitation of the robin . . . .”
B. The MBTA’s Simple Mandate Has Remained Almost Unchanged
Since Enactment
The MBTA is a very simple statute, especially in comparison to
other environmental statutes. Its main operative provisions are found
26
27
28
Using very expansive language,
in sections 703 and 704(a).
section 703 prohibits taking “at any time, by any means or in any
manner . . . any migratory bird, [or] any part, nest, or eggs of any such
29
bird” unless authorized by the Secretary of the Interior. Section
704(a) authorizes the Secretary to issue regulations that allow the
taking of migratory birds that are “compatible with the terms” and
30
“carry out the purposes” of the migratory bird conventions. These
two primary sections are supplemented and implemented by eight
31
other sections. The remaining sections cover bird baiting, transpor32
33
tation and importation of birds, arrests and search warrants,

23. H.R. REP. NO. 65-243, at 2 (1918) (stating that five million sportsmen in the
country urge “prompt action to protect migratory birds”).
24. H.R. REP. NO. 65-243, at 2 (speaking of a “patriotic duty” to prevent “the
indiscriminate slaughter of birds which destroy insects which feed upon our crops
and damage hem [sic] to the extent of many millions of dollars”).
25. H.R. REP. NO. 65-243, at 2–3 (“[M]illions of people in the United States are
deeply interested in the conservation and increase of our bird life from an esthetic
viewpoint . . . .”).
26. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2006).
27. 16 U.S.C. § 704(a) (2006).
28. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 56, 57, 59–60 (1979) (describing the
statutory prohibitions of the MBTA as “comprehensive,” “exhaustive,” “carefully
enumerated,” “expansive,” and “sweepingly framed”).
29. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–704 (2006).
30. 16 U.S.C. § 704(a) (2006).
31. 16 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2006) (providing that it is unlawful to bait a migratory
bird and knowingly take a migratory bird over a baited field).
32. 16 U.S.C. § 705 (2006) (providing that it is unlawful to transport or import
illegally taken migratory birds across state or country lines).
33. 16 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (authorizing employees of the Department of the
Interior to enforce the Act by arresting without a warrant any person violating the Act
in his or her presence).
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35

36

penalties, allowance of more protective state laws, appropriations,
37
38
the statute’s short title and savings clause, game farms, and
39
authorization for implementing regulations.
The MBTA has remained almost unchanged since enactment in
1918. Congress passed technical amendments to the MBTA to
incorporate three additional migratory bird conventions, including
40
41
42
Mexico in 1936, Japan in 1974, and the U.S.S.R. in 1989.
43
44
Congress amended the MBTA in 1960 and 1998 to increase fines
for violations, and in 1978 to require forfeiture of illegally taken birds,

34. 16 U.S.C. § 707 (2006) (providing a $15,000 fine and/or six months
imprisonment for misdemeanor violations of the Act and providing a $2,000 fine
and/or two years imprisonment and forfeiture of all equipment used by persons
guilty of felony violations, which are defined as knowingly taking with the intent to
sell migratory birds).
35. 16 U.S.C. § 708 (2006) (providing that the states may make and enforce laws
more protective of migratory birds).
36. 16 U.S.C. § 709a (2006) (authorizing appropriations to carry out the
conventions and the statute).
37. 16 U.S.C. § 710 (2006) (providing that if any clause of the MBTA is found
invalid the remaining parts should be unaffected).
38. 16 U.S.C. § 711 (2006) (providing that the Act does not prevent breeding of
migratory game birds on game farms).
39. 16 U.S.C. § 712 (2006) (authorizing the Secretary to issue regulations to
allow the taking of migratory birds for subsistence by indigenous inhabitants of Alaska
and generally authorizing the Secretary to issues regulations necessary for implementation of the migratory bird conventions).
40. Act of June 20, 1936, ch. 634, 49 Stat. 1555 (1936)(current version at 16
U.S.C. § 703 (2006)); Convention Between the United States of America and the
United Mexican States for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Game Mammals,
U.S.-Mex., Feb. 7, 1936, 50 Stat. 1311 [hereinafter “Mexican Convention”].
41. Act of June 1, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-300, 88 Stat. 190 (1974) (current 16
U.S.C. § 703 (2006)); Convention Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of Japan for the Protection of Migratory Birds and
Birds in Danger of Extinction, and Their Environment, U.S.-Japan, Mar. 4, 1972, 25
U.S.T. 3329 [hereinafter “Japanese Convention”].
42. North American Wetlands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 101-233, 103 Stat.
1968, § 15 (1989) (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2006)); Convention Between
the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning
the Conservation of Migratory Birds and Their Environment, U.S.-U.S.S.R., Nov. 19,
1976, 29 U.S.T. 4647 [hereinafter “Soviet Convention”].
43. Act of Sept. 8, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-732, 74 Stat. 866 (1960) (current version
at 16 U.S.C. §§ 704, 707 (2006)) (retaining the $500 fine and/or six months in jail for
misdemeanor convictions, while adding a felony conviction for taking migratory birds
with the intent to sell, subject to a $2000 fine and/or two years in jail and forfeiture of
all equipment used in the violation).
44. Migratory Bird Treaty Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 105-312, § 103, 112 Stat. 2956
(1998) (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 704, 707 (2006)) (increasing the fine for
misdemeanor convictions from $500 to $15,000).
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45

bird parts, nests, and eggs. Language added in 1974 clarified that
the MBTA’s prohibition on the sale of migratory birds includes “any
46
product . . . composed in whole or part, of any such bird.” Congress
has three times directed the Secretary to promulgate regulations to
allow the taking of migratory birds, including take by Alaskan
47
subsistence hunters in 1978, take of overabundant populations of
48
49
mid-continent light geese in 1999, and take by the military in 2002.
While the MBTA is generally a strict liability statute, Congress added
scienter requirements in 1986 for felony prosecutions for selling
50
migratory birds, and in 1998 for misdemeanor prosecutions for
51
Most recently, in 2004, Congress
hunting over baited fields.
amended the MBTA to limit its application to migratory bird species
52
native to the United States or its territories. While there were several
53
other minor or technical amendments, it is clear that the MBTA has
gone through a very modest evolution over the ninety years since its
passage.

45. Act of Nov. 8, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-616, § 3(h)(1), 92 Stat. 3111–12 (1978)
(current version at 16 U.S.C. § 706 (2006)).
46. Act of June 1, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-300, § 1, 88 Stat. 190 (1974).
47. Act of Nov. 8, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-616, § 3(h)(2), 92 Stat. 3112 (1978).
48. Arctic Tundra Habitat Emergency Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 106-108, §§
1–5, 113 Stat. 1491 (1999).
49. Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L.
No. 107-314, § 315, 116 Stat. 2509 (2002).
50. Emergency Wetlands Resources Act, Pub. L. No. 99-645, § 501, 100 Stat. 3590
(1986) (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2006)) (requiring knowledge that
actions constitute sale, barter, or offer to sell an item and that such item was a bird or
portion thereof).
51. Migratory Bird Treaty Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 105-312, § 102, 112 Stat. 2956
(1998) (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 704(b)) (amending the Act to make unlawful
hunting over baited fields where “the person knows or reasonably should know that”
he or she is hunting over baited fields and making baiting a separate offense from
hunting over a baited field).
52. Migratory Bird Treaty Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 143(b),
118 Stat. 3071 (2004); see Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Kempthorne, 472 F.3d 872, 876
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (refusing to enjoin the State of Maryland from killing mute swans to
protect aquatic habitat because mute swans are not native migratory birds).
53. Act of June 20, 1936, ch. 634, 49 Stat. 1555–57 (1936) (making appropriations language more currently applicable and adding language to protect game
mammals consistent with the Mexican convention); 1939 Reorg. Plan No. II, § 4(f),
53 Stat. 1433, 1433–34 (1939) (transferring function of the Secretary of Agriculture
dealing with “wild life, game, and migratory birds” to the Secretary of the Interior);
Federal Magistrates Act, Pub. L. No. 90-578, § 402(b)(2), 82 Stat. 1118 (1968) (redesignating the U.S. commissioner with the U.S. magistrate); Act of Dec. 5, 1969,
Pub. L. No. 91-135, § 10, 83 Stat. 282 (1969) (repealing and moving a section offering
protection for game mammals).
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II. COURTS DISAGREE ABOUT WHETHER THE MBTA APPLIES TO
HABITAT DESTRUCTION
The MBTA clearly prohibits the taking of migratory birds, but it
54
does not precisely define what activities should constitute a taking.
So, it is unclear whether the MBTA should apply to activities that
55
destroy migratory bird habitat. Unlike the ESA, the United States
Supreme Court has not interpreted the takings provision in the
MBTA, but the issue has been litigated before several appellate and
district courts.
A. Several Courts Hold That the MBTA Applies to Physical Conduct of
the Sort Engaged in by Hunters and Poachers and Does Not Apply to
Indirect Deaths of Migratory Birds Caused By Habitat Destruction
56

Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans closely explores applicability of
the MBTA to habitat destruction. In Seattle Audubon, two bird
conservation organizations argued that logging of old-growth timber
in Washington and Oregon constitutes a violation of the MBTA
57
because it destroys spotted owl habitat. The Ninth Circuit compared
the MBTA and the ESA and concluded that the differences are
58
“distinct and purposeful.” The MBTA’s implementing regulations
define “take” as “pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or
59
collect,” or to attempt any such act. The definition of “take” in the
ESA, in contrast, is defined in a broader way to include “harass” and
60
“harm.” The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the MBTA’s definition
describes “physical conduct of the sort engaged in by hunters and
poachers, conduct which was undoubtedly a concern at the time of

54. The MBTA provides that it shall be unlawful “to pursue, hunt, take, capture,
kill, attempt to take, capture, or kill” migratory birds. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2006). The
MBTA’s implementing regulations define take as “pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill,
trap, capture, or collect, or attempt” any such act. 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (2009).
55. The definition of take in the ESA includes “harm,” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19)
(2006), and the United States Supreme Court upheld regulations defining harm as
“significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures
wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavior patterns, including breeding,
feeding, or sheltering.” Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687, 691, 708 (1995) (citing 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994)).
56. 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991).
57. Id. at 298.
58. Id. at 303 (quoting Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081 (W.D.
Wash. 1991)).
59. 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (2009).
60. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2006).
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61

the statute’s enactment in 1918.” The Ninth Circuit also relied on
the fact that Congress failed to modify the MBTA to include “harm”
or “harass,” even though it amended the MBTA the year following the
62
enactment of the ESA.
The Ninth Circuit emphasized that indirect killing during logging operations is different from direct, but unintentional, killing that
63
occurs when birds are poisoned. With this emphasis, the Ninth
Circuit distinguished Seattle Audubon from two cases that held that
poisoning of migratory birds falls within the MBTA’s prohibition on
64
65
taking. In United States v. Corbin Farm Service, the district court ruled
that defendants could be charged under the MBTA for bird deaths
that occurred after applying a toxic pesticide to an alfalfa field
66
67
inhabited by migratory birds. In United States v. FMC Corp., the
Second Circuit affirmed a criminal conviction for a pesticide corporation’s release of toxic chemicals into a wastewater pond that killed
68
migratory birds.
Most courts construing the MBTA in the context of habitat destruction have followed Seattle Audubon. In Newton County Wildlife Ass’n
69
v. United States Forest Service, for example, the Eighth Circuit reasoned
that the MBTA applies only to “physical conduct of the sort engaged
in by hunters and poachers” and refused to enjoin four timber sales
70
in the Ozarks National Forest. There have also been several district
courts that have considered and rejected arguments that the MBTA
71
applies to indirect bird deaths caused by habitat destruction.
61. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 952 F.2d at 302.
62. Id. at 303.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 444 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Cal. 1978).
66. Id. at 514, 536. As an example of another corporate criminal conviction
under the MBTA, the Exxon Corporation recently pled guilty to violating the MBTA
in the deaths of eighty-five protected birds across five central and western states over
the past five years. The birds were killed after they came into contact with hydrocarbons at oil tanks, evaporation ponds, natural gas reserve pits, and disposal facilities.
United States v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 09-mj-01097 (D. Colo. 2009); Amy Littlefield,
Exxon Pleads Guilty in Birds’ Deaths, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2009, at A15.
67. 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978).
68. Id. at 907–08.
69. 113 F.3d 110 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1108 (1998).
70. Id. at 113–16. “[W]e agree with the Ninth Circuit that the ambiguous terms
‘take’ and ‘kill’ in 16 U.S.C. § 703 mean ‘physical conduct of the sort engaged in by
hunters and poachers, conduct which was undoubtedly a concern at the time of the
statute’s enactment in 1918.’” Id. at 115. In addition, the Eighth Circuit tentatively
held that the MBTA does not even apply to federal agencies. Id.
71. Curry v. U.S. Forest Serv., 988 F. Supp. 541, 548–49 (W.D. Pa.1997) (holding
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B. A Few Courts Hold That the MBTA Applies to Direct Deaths of
Migratory Birds from Habitat Destruction That Occurs During the Nesting
Season
No federal court has held that the MBTA applies to habitat destruction that indirectly causes deaths of migratory birds by making
72
habitat unsuitable. As such, environmental plaintiffs have focused
on logging during the nesting season because it directly destroys nests
73
and eggs and juvenile birds that cannot fly away. Sierra Club v.
74
Martin provides the most complete discussion on the applicability of
the MBTA to habitat destruction that directly kills birds. In Martin,
the Sierra Club challenged timber sales during the nesting season in
75
Chattahoochee and Oconee National Forests. The district court
agreed with the Seattle Audubon line of cases that the MBTA does not
76
apply to habitat destruction that only indirectly kills migratory birds.
that the MBTA does not apply to federal agencies but assuming, arguendo, that it did
apply, citing Seattle Audubon and holding that habitat destruction does not fall within
the MBTA because it applies only to hunters and poachers); Sierra Club v. Martin,
933 F. Supp. 1559, 1564–65 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (following the Seattle Audubon line in so
far as holding that the MBTA does not apply to indirect deaths but granting plaintiffs
a preliminary injunction based on claim that timber sales during the nesting season
would directly kill migratory birds in violation of the MBTA); Citizens Interested in
Bull Run, Inc. v. Edrington, 781 F. Supp. 1502, 1509–10 (D. Or. 1991) (citing district
court cases leading up to Seattle Audubon and finding that the proposed timber sale
does not constitute a taking of migratory birds because the MBTA applies only to
hunters and poachers); Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Lujan, No. 87-1160-FR, 1991 WL
81838, at *6–7 (D. Or. May 8, 1991) (holding that differences between the ESA and
MBTA are “distinct and purposeful” and MBTA does not apply to habitat destruction); Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Robertson, Nos. 89-160WD, C89-99(T)WD, 1991 WL
180099, at *11 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 7, 1991) (finding that the absence of “harm” and
“harass” in the MBTA makes it distinct from the ESA); see also Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n.,
126 IBLA 48, 66 (1993) (citing a district court case leading up to Seattle Audubon and
holding that approval of a mining plan of operations does not involve a “taking” of
migratory birds under the MBTA); In re Bar First Go Round Salvage Sale, 121 IBLA
347, 351–52 (1991) (citing district court cases leading up to Seattle Audubon and
rejecting the argument that BLM’s timber sales violate the MBTA and holding that
even if MBTA did include habitat modification there is no evidence that the timber
sale will kill birds).
72. But see Or. Natural Res. Council, 116 IBLA 355, 370 (1990) (“Therefore,
action which degrades the environment in such a way as to result in the death of a
migratory bird is prohibited by section 2 of the MBTA.”).
73. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 96-2244, 1997 WL 295308, at
*19 (7th Cir. May 28, 1997); Sierra Club v. Martin, 933 F. Supp. 1559, 1563 (N.D. Ga.
1996), rev’d, 110 F.3d 1551 (11th Cir. 1997); Mahler v. U.S. Forest Serv., 927 F. Supp.
1559, 1573 (S.D. Ind. 1996).
74. 933 F. Supp. 1559.
75. Id. at 1562–64.
76. Id. at 1564–65.
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However, the court departed from Seattle Audubon when it held that
the MBTA extends beyond hunters and poachers and does apply to
77
timber sales during the nesting season.
The court’s decision relies heavily on United States v. Corbin Farm
Service, one of the bird poisoning cases, which also held that the
78
MBTA extends beyond hunting and poaching. As in Corbin Farm
Service, the court was persuaded by the broad language in the MBTA,
79
which prohibits killing migratory birds “by any means.” The court
also reasoned that hunting is not the sole concern of the MBTA
because many birds protected by the MBTA are not commonly
80
hunted.
Sierra Club v. Martin was not the first case to distinguish between
direct and indirect deaths from logging. Martin followed Sierra Club v.
81
United States Department of Agriculture. In Sierra Club v. United States
Department of Agriculture, the Seventh Circuit held that the MBTA does
not apply to birds killed indirectly by habitat destruction, but the
court ordered the agency to consider on remand whether logging
during the nesting season would directly kill young migratory birds in
82
violation of the MBTA.
Unlike this Seventh Circuit case, the
environmental plaintiffs in Sierra Club v. Martin had affirmative
83
evidence of the number of bird deaths that would occur. Given the
likelihood of success on its MBTA claim, the district court granted the
84
Sierra Club a preliminary injunction to stop the timber sales. The
decision was later reversed by the Eleventh Circuit, which held that
85
the MBTA does not apply to federal agencies, but this holding
contradicts a later decision from the D.C. Circuit and dicta from the
86
United States Supreme Court.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 1565; United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510 (E.D.
Cal. 1978); see also supra text accompanying note 66.
79. Martin, 933 F. Supp. at 1565 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2000)).
80. Id.
81. 116 F.3d 1482 (7th Cir. 1997).
82. Id. at *19–20.
83. Martin, 933 F. Supp. at 1563, 1565 (finding that 2,000 to 9,000 juvenile
migratory birds will be killed directly by timber sale projects).
84. Id. at 1572–73.
85. Sierra Club v. Martin, 110 F.3d 1551 (11th Cir. 1997).
86. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 437–38 (1992) (indicating
in two sections of its opinion that federal agencies possess obligations under the
MBTA); Humane Soc’y v. Glickman, 217 F.3d 882, 886–88 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding
that the MBTA does apply to federal agencies because the Administrative Procedures
Act may be used by a party with standing to challenge government action that would
violate the MBTA); see Michael Deminico & Heather Eisenlord, A Proper Refusal of
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C. One Court Holds That the MBTA Does Not Apply to Even Direct
Deaths of Migratory Birds From Habitat Destruction If the Deaths are
Unintentional
87

In Mahler v. United States Forest Service, another district court addressed whether the MBTA applies to direct deaths of migratory birds
88
caused by habitat destruction. In Mahler, a nearby resident and
frequent visitor to the Hoosier National Forest sought to enjoin a
timber salvage operation on fifty acres of forest during the nesting
89
season. Even though the court agreed with the plaintiff that logging
operations during nesting would directly kill birds, the court refused
90
to enjoin the United States Forest Service. The court held that the
MBTA only applies to activities that are “intended to harm birds or to
exploit birds, such as hunting and trapping, and trafficking in birds
91
and bird parts.”
The court acknowledged that there have been convictions under
the MBTA for unintentional deaths of migratory birds due to
92
poisoning. The court found the strict liability approach unreasonable, however, because it “would impose criminal liability on a person
for the death of a bird under circumstances where no criminal
93
liability would be imposed for even the death of another person.”
The court was particularly concerned that there would be no stopping
point for criminal liability and suggested that strict liability would
even require conviction of farmers who run over nests while mowing
94
hay.
Deference: An Analysis of Humane Society v. Glickman in Light of the Supreme Court’s Most
Recent Standard for Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpretation, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
378, 390–98 (2002); Helen M. Kim, Chopping Down the Birds: Logging and the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act, 31 ENVTL. L. 125, 141–48 (2001).
87. 927 F. Supp. 1559 (E.D. Ind. 1996).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1575.
90. Id. at 1583. Indeed, there is a substantial body of case law holding that the
MBTA has no scienter requirement. See United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6160 (D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2009) (summarizing cases and affirming
misdemeanor convictions under the MBTA for deaths of migratory birds unintentionally killed by devices used in the oil and gas industry to process crude oil).
91. Mahler, 927 F. Supp. at 1579 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 1577–79.
93. Id. at 1578.
94. Id. Similar concerns motivated a district court to reverse a conviction under
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Unlike most cases dealing with habitat destruction under the
MBTA, the Mahler court provided a lengthy analysis of the language,
95
legislative history, and application of the MBTA. The court reasoned that the MBTA’s broad language only extended “by any means
96
or in any manner” to the hunting of migratory birds. The court
sifted through the MBTA’s legislative history and found no indication
that Congress had intended the MBTA to extend to habitat destruc97
tion. Finally, the court was unwilling to accept strict liability because
of fear that it would substantially restrict logging on both public and
98
private lands.
III. DESTRUCTION OF HABITAT THAT DIRECTLY KILLS MIGRATORY
BIRDS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A VIOLATION OF THE MBTA
Environmental plaintiffs wishing to use the MBTA to protect migratory bird habitat have been largely unsuccessful, with courts
99
seeking defensible approaches to limit MBTA liability. The Seattle
Audubon line of cases emphasizes distinctions between the ESA and
MBTA to justify the conclusion that the MBTA applies only to direct
100
physical conduct of the sort engaged in by hunters and poachers.
101
Mahler requires intent to kill migratory birds. A critical analysis of
the MBTA’s text, legislative history, purpose, and prior applications
shows that both approaches are flawed. The MBTA should not be
limited to hunting and poaching nor only intentional acts, but there
must be a reasonable stopping point for MBTA liability. Analysis of
the closeness of the causal link may offer the best approach to limiting
liability.
A. Application of the MBTA Should Extend Beyond Hunting and
the MBTA of a defendant that applied pesticides to seed alfalfa growing on his farm
that resulted in the death of a flock of geese that ingested the pesticides. United
States v. Rollins, 706 F. Supp. 742 (D. Idaho 1989). The district court commented
that because the MBTA is a strict liability statute “a homeowner could be pursued
under the MBTA if a flock of geese crashed into his plate-glass window and were
killed.” Id. at 744. Finding the statute vague, the district court held that it would be
unconstitutional to impose criminal liability because the pesticide was applied with
due care and its use in the past had occurred without serious incident. Id. at 743–44.
95. Mahler, 927 F. Supp. at 1579–83.
96. Id. at 1579.
97. Id. at 1580–81.
98. Id. at 1581–82.
99. See supra Part II.
100. See supra Part II A.
101. See supra Part II C.
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Poaching
102

The MBTA uses extremely broad language. Section 703 of the
MBTA provides that it shall be unlawful “by any means or in any
103
manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, [or] kill” migratory birds.
The phrase “by any means or in any manner” emphasizes the MBTA’s
expansive scope. In addition, if Congress intended the MBTA to only
apply to hunting and poaching, there was no need to include the
broader words “take” and “kill.” Admittedly, it is unclear how
broadly “take” and “kill” should be interpreted, and there is a strong
argument that the MBTA should be interpreted more narrowly than
104
the ESA. Just because there are “distinct and purposeful” differ105
ences between the MBTA and ESA, however, does not mean that
the MBTA must be limited to hunting and poaching.
Legislative history does not offer a decisive answer to how broadly
the MBTA should be interpreted. Some statements by members of
Congress indicate that controlling overexploitation of game birds was
106
the MBTA’s primary focus, but others discuss the expansiveness of
107
the MBTA’s prohibitions. Even if negotiation of the original treaty
was primarily motivated by concerns about overexploitation of game
birds, it is nevertheless clear from the legislative history that concerns
about loss of migratory bird habitat and non-game birds were
108
additional motivating factors.
Indeed, the MBTA protects more
109
than 800 species, but only a small fraction of these species are
110
If the MBTA merely
commonly sought by hunters or poachers.
102. See supra note 28.
103. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2006).
104. See supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 58.
106. See, e.g., 55 CONG. REC. 4816 (1917) (statement of Sen. Smith) (“Nobody is
trying to do anything here except to keep pothunters from killing game out of
season, ruining the eggs of nesting birds, and ruining the country by it.”), cited in
United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1080 (D. Colo. 1999)
(providing a summary of comments from the Congressional Record indicating that
Congress intended the MBTA to regulate recreational and commercial hunting).
107. See, e.g., 56 CONG. REC. 7458 (1918) (statement of Sen. Smith) (“If we are
going to have a treaty about migratory birds, let us have some place where they can
come and remain safely and be a pleasure and companions.”), cited in Moon Lake Elec.
Ass’n, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 1080–81 (providing a summary of comments from the
Congressional Record indicating that Congress intended the MBTA to regulate more
than just hunting and poaching).
108. See supra notes 17–25 and accompanying text.
109. See 50 C.F.R. § 10.13 (2009) (listing the species of migratory birds protected
by the MBTA).
110. See id.; see also Sierra Club v. Martin, 933 F. Supp. 1559, 1565 (N.D. Ga. 1996)
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prohibits hunting and poaching, there was no reason to offer
protection to nongame species.
Supporters of a narrow construction of “take” argue that Congress’s failure to amend the MBTA to include “harm” and “harass”
111
shows that Congress did not intend the MBTA to apply to habitat.
This reasoning is unpersuasive, however, because Congress was also
aware that the MBTA has been applied in contexts outside of hunting
and poaching—but Congress did not amend the MBTA to limit its
112
application. Specifically, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
113
114
has prosecuted bird deaths from oil pits, exposure to pesticides,
115
and electrocution by electrical wires. In addition, environmental
groups have brought claims involving bird deaths from habitat
116
117
destruction, pollution from mine tailings, and military bombing

(noting that song birds and other birds not commonly hunted are protected by the
MBTA).
111. See Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 303 (9th Cir. 1991)
(finding the MBTA’s definition of “take” did not include habitat modification or
degradation due to the fact that Congress failed to modify the MBTA to include harm
or harass, even though it amended the MBTA the year following the enactment of the
ESA).
112. For example, Congress held hearings in 1985 to discuss whether the
operation of a contaminated reservoir by a federal agency violated the MBTA.
Agricultural Drainage Problems and Contamination at Kesterson Reservoir: Hearing before the
Subcomm. on Water and Power Resources of the H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs,
99th Cong. 10–19, 22–25, 30–39, 42–43, 45–51, 62–65, 104–10, 128–30, 150–51, 215,
523–24, 525–32 (1985). Although the hearings alerted Congress that under current
case law the reservoir may violate the MBTA, Congress never amended the MBTA to
limit its application to hunters and poachers.
113. See, e.g., United States v. Union Tex. Petroleum, No. 73-CR-127, 1973 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15616 (D. Colo. July 11, 1973); see also Coggins & Patti, supra note 18, at
184–85 (summarizing Union Tex. Petroleum, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15616, United
States v. Equity Corp., Cr. No. 75-51 (D. Utah Dec. 8, 1975), and United States v.
Stuarco Oil, No. 73-CR-129, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15616 (D. Colo. July 11, 1973)—a
case consolidated with United States v. Texas Petroleum).
114. See supra notes 63–68 and accompanying text.
115. See infra notes 133–136 and accompanying text.
116. See supra Part II. Congress seemed to acquiesce to the notion that the MBTA
applies to migratory bird habitat when it passed Northwest Timber Compromise,
which provided a limited exemption from the MBTA for old-growth timber sales in
Washington and Oregon from the MBTA. Department of the Interior and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 101-121, 103 Stat. 745 (1989) (providing in
section 318 that certain timber sales affecting spotted owls would be in compliance
with all other environmental laws if the sales meet the requirements in the Northwest
Timber Compromise); see Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 437–38
(1992) (explaining how the Northwest Timber Compromise exempted certain sales
from the MBTA).
117. See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 126 IBLA 48 (1993).
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118

exercises. Congress’s failure to amend the MBTA in response to
these cases indicates Congress’s acquiescence to a broader application.
Rather than amend the MBTA to narrow its scope, Congress has
119
largely left the MBTA alone. Most amendments to the MBTA have
120
broadened its scope or strengthened its protections. For example,
Congress amended the MBTA to incorporate additional migratory
121
bird conventions that expand protections for migratory birds.
Importantly, the Japanese and Soviet Conventions include language
122
about protection of migratory bird habitat.
B. Application of the MBTA Should Extend to Unintentional Acts
The MBTA makes a distinction between misdemeanor and felony
offenses. Section 707(a) provides that “any person . . . who shall
violate any provisions of said conventions or of this [Act] . . . shall be
123
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.”
Section 707(b) provides that
“[w]hoever, in violation of this [Act], shall knowingly . . . take by any
manner whatsoever any migratory bird with intent to sell . . . such
124
bird, or . . . sell . . . any migratory bird shall be guilty of a felony.”

118. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Pirie, 201 F. Supp. 2d 113 (D.D.C. 2002).
When environmental groups succeeded on their claim that bird deaths during
military training exercises violated the MBTA, Congress did not amend the act to
restrict its application to hunters. Rather, it provided a temporary exemption for the
military until the United States Fish and Wildlife Service promulgates regulations to
allow take during military training exercises. See supra note 49.
119. See supra notes 40–53 and accompanying text.
120. The only exceptions thus far were when Congress added scienter requirements for certain offenses, and directed the United States Fish and Wildlife Service to
promulgate regulations to allow bird take. See supra notes 47–51 and accompanying
text.
121. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text.
122. The Japanese Convention endeavors to establish sanctuaries and “take
appropriate measures to preserve and enhance the environment.” The Convention
Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
Japan for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Birds in Danger of Distinction, and
Their Environment, U.S.-Japan, Sep. 19, 1974, 25 U.S.T. 3329, 3335. The Russian
Convention commits the parties to establish preserves, protected areas, and facilities
for the conservation of migratory birds and take measures necessary “to protect and
enhance the environment of migratory birds and to prevent and abate the pollution
or detrimental alteration of that environment.” The Convention Between the United
States of America and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning the
Conservation of Migratory Birds and Their Environment, U.S.–U.S.S.R., Nov. 19,
1976, 29 U.S.T. 4647, 4653.
123. 16 U.S.C. § 707(a) (2006).
124. 16 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2006) (emphasis added).
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In 1960, Congress added section 707(b) in response to concerns that
market hunters that kill hundreds of birds were subject to the same
125
liability as a sport hunter that took one bird out of season. In 1986,
Congress added “knowingly” to section 707(b) because of concerns
126
about the constitutionality of strict liability felony offenses.
If Congress wanted to alter the strict liability scheme for misdemeanors, Congress would have added the term “knowingly” to
section 707(a) and section 707(b). Rather, the legislative history
makes clear that Congress intended to retain strict liability for
misdemeanor offenses: “Nothing in this amendment is intended to
alter the ‘strict liability’ standard for misdemeanor prosecutions
under 16 U.S.C. [§] 707(a), a standard which has been upheld in
127
many Federal court decisions.”
Mahler construed the MBTA to require intentionality because of
concern that any other interpretation would lead to unreasonable
128
results.
Nevertheless, most courts that have examined this issue
129
have upheld the strict liability scheme for misdemeanor offenses.
Even though adding the intentionality requirement might be a
convenient way to limit MBTA liability, this interpretation is simply
not what Congress intended.
C. Analysis of the Causal Link May be the Best Approach to Limit MBTA
Liability
The MBTA’s language is expansive and provides no clear limits to
liability. As a consequence, inconsistent judicial interpretations have
130
A defensible limit on liability is
created substantial uncertainty.

125. S. REP. NO. 86-1779, at 1 (1960).
126. S. REP. NO. 99-445, at 16 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6113, 6128.
127. Id. But see Mahler v. U.S. Forest Serv., 927 F. Supp. 1559, 1581 (S.D. Ind.
1996) (arguing that Congress retained strict liability only in so far as it affects hunters
and poachers, so there is no liability for habitat destruction that leads to the
unintentional death of birds).
128. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
129. See United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 805 (10th Cir. 1997); United States
v. Smith, 29 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425, 431
(3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1019 (1987); United States v. Chandler, 753 F.2d
360, 363 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Catlett, 747 F.2d 1102, 1105 (6th Cir. 1984);
United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 908 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Wood,
437 F.2d 91, 91 (9th Cir. 1971); Rogers v. United States, 367 F.2d 998, 1001 (8th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 943 (1967). But see United States v. Delahoussaye, 573
F.2d 910, 913 (5th Cir. 1978) (requiring a showing of negligence).
130. See supra Part II.
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131

needed, and analysis of the causal link leading to bird death may
132
offer the best approach.
1. Only a Few Courts Have Used a Causal Analysis to Limit MBTA
Liability
The only MBTA case explicitly examining the closeness of the
133
causal link is United States v. Moon Lake Electrical Ass’n. In Moon Lake
Electrical Ass’n, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service brought
charges against a rural electrical cooperative for the deaths of
seventeen migratory birds of prey, caused by the company’s failure to
134
install inexpensive equipment on power poles. The court refused to
dismiss the charges and used a proximate cause analysis to assess
135
MBTA liability. The court explained:
[T]o obtain a guilty verdict under § 707(a), the government
must prove proximate causation, also known as “legal causation,” beyond a reasonable doubt. In this context, “proximate cause” is generally defined as “that which, in a natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the
accident could not have happened, if the injury be one
which might be reasonably anticipated or foreseen as a nat136
ural consequence of the wrongful act.”
The causal link approach hinges on the directness of the link and
the foreseeability of bird deaths. A similar approach was used in Sierra
137
Club v. Martin and Sierra Club v. USDA. These cases made a critical
distinction between timber harvest that directly killed migratory birds
by cutting down trees containing active nests, and timber harvest that
only indirectly killed birds by making habitat unsuitable for migratory
138
birds. Although these cases did not explicitly examine the closeness
of the causal link, the analysis of whether the action directly or
indirectly killed birds inherently involves a causation analysis.
131. See United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 905 (2d Cir. 1978) (“Certainly
construction that would bring every killing within the statute, such as deaths caused
by automobiles, airplanes, plate glass modern office buildings or picture windows in
residential dwellings into which birds fly, would offend reason and common sense.”).
132. One legal scholar has argued that proximate cause is the only comprehensive
analytical structure for analyzing MBTA guilt. See Kim, supra note 86, at 140–41.
133. United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (D. Colo. 1999).
134. Id. at 1071.
135. Id. at 1085, 1088.
136. Id. at 1085 (emphasis and citation omitted).
137. See supra notes 73–86 and accompanying text.
138. See id.
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2. Analysis of the Closeness of the Causal Link Has Many
Advantages
The Moon Lake court did not offer any analysis in defense of the
causal approach, but it has several advantages. To begin, a causal
approach is justifiable based upon the plain language of the MBTA.
As Seattle Audubon emphasizes, the MBTA’s statutory language is
139
meaningfully different from the ESA. The inclusion of “harm” and
“harass” in the definition of “take” in the ESA allows “take” to
encompass indirect actions in the ESA that are not appropriate for
140
the MBTA. The use of a causal approach for the MBTA reflects this
difference by requiring a direct link between the action and bird
141
death. Unlike Seattle Audubon, the causal approach recognizes that
the MBTA is different from the ESA without arbitrarily limiting it to
hunters and poachers.
A second advantage of the causal method is that it comports with
prior applications of the MBTA. It is unreasonable to interpret the
142
MBTA broadly when birds are killed from exposure to oil pits and
143
pesticides but purport to limit the MBTA to hunting and poaching
144
when birds are killed from habitat destruction. The causal method
offers a reasoned explanation for attaching MBTA liability for direct
deaths of birds from oil pits, poisons, and habitat destruction during
the nesting season, while not extending liability for habitat destruction that only indirectly kills birds by making habitat unsuitable.
Another advantage is that the causal approach allows the MBTA
to respond to modern threats to migratory birds. Overexploitation
was once the biggest threat to biodiversity, but habitat destruction and
145
pollution are much bigger threats today.
Congress intended the
146
MBTA to protect migratory birds, and even though loss of birds
from hunters and poachers may have been a primary focus at the time
147
of enactment, Congress’s expansive language needs to be interpreted broadly for the MBTA to continue to have relevance today.
139. See supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 55.
141. A direct link can be defined as “a natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause.” Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, 45 F. Supp. 2d at
1085.
142. See supra note 113.
143. See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text.
144. See supra Part II A.
145. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
146. See supra Part I A.
147. See supra notes 17–25 and accompanying text.
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A final advantage of the causal approach is that it offers some
protection for migratory bird habitat without incapacitating the
timber industry. By prohibiting habitat destruction that directly kills
migratory birds, the causal approach would likely prohibit the timber
148
industry from harvesting during the nesting season. In many parts
of the country, timber is already primarily harvested in the winter to
prevent damage to soils and vegetation that can occur when the
ground is soft. Although prohibiting timber harvest during the
nesting season might create some hardship for the timber industry,
this application of the MBTA has the advantage of ending the present
inconsistency of allowing loggers to kill an unlimited number of
migratory birds while at the same time prosecuting individuals for
149
selling a feather.
3.

Causal Link Analysis Does Not Provide Needed Certainty

The causal link approach to limiting MBTA liability has many
advantages, but it widens potential liability without providing a bright150
line test. This uncertainty is problematic. Uncertainty raises due
151
process concerns because the MBTA is a criminal statute. It also
generates litigation as environmental groups test legal theories and try
152
to find new ways to use the MBTA to shape land management.
Significantly, uncertainty leaves courts in the position of making
153
policy decisions —decisions that should be made by Congress.
Even though the causal link approach would subject many activities to potential MBTA liability, there are constraining factors. First,
148. Because harvesting during the nesting season directly destroys eggs and
nests, and kills juvenile birds, the causal link is much closer than timber harvest that
merely makes habitat unsuitable for migratory birds. See supra notes 73–86 and
accompanying text.
149. Kim, supra note 86, at 150. Logging does kill many birds. One study found
that up to 666 nests would be destroyed as a result of four timber sales in Arkansas,
and another found that up to 9000 young migratory birds would be killed by seven
timber sales in Georgia. See Alliance for the Wild Rockies et al., Submission to the
Commission on Environmental Cooperation Pursuant to Article 14 of the North American
Agreement
on
Environmental
Cooperation,
at
9,
available
at
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/99-2-SUB-E.pdf.
150. For example, an argument can be made that the MBTA should apply to bird
deaths from collision with communication towers because the deaths are direct,
foreseeable, and avoidable. See Larry Martin Corcoran, Migratory Bird Treaty Act: Strict
Criminal Liability for Non-hunting, Human Caused Bird Deaths, 77 DENV. U. L. REV. 315,
351–53 (1999).
151. Id. at 337–38.
152. Kim, supra note 86, at 149.
153. See Corcoran, supra note 150, at 341–42.
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prosecutorial discretion will prevent most unreasonable applications
of the MBTA. Indeed, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service has
154
In addition, judicial
never enforced the MBTA against loggers.
discretion in sentencing will ensure that unreasonable applications
155
are met with minor penalties. Finally, the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service could use its authority under section 704(a) to
promulgate regulations that allow taking of migratory birds by loggers
and others, as long as the regulations are consistent with the terms
156
and purposes of the migratory bird conventions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Even though Congress enacted the MBTA over eighty-five years
ago, its expansive statutory language provides the capacity to address
current threats to migratory birds. Nevertheless, courts are extremely
reluctant to apply the MBTA to habitat destruction and generally hold
that the statute only applies to hunters and poachers or intentional
acts. An analysis of the MBTA’s text, legislative history, purpose, and
prior applications shows that the statute should be interpreted
broadly to prohibit some habitat destruction. A causal link analysis
may offer a reasoned stopping point for liability, but it does not
provide needed certainty.
As threats to wildlife change, the need for environmental statutes
designed to address these threats increases. Unfortunately, current
environmental laws form a fragmented network that leaves wildlife
inadequately protected. Extending the MBTA to reach migratory bird
habitat would fill one of these gaps. Without a clear mandate from

154. Alliance for the Wild Rockies, supra note 149, at 12 (citing Draft Memorandum from Director, FWS, to Service Law Enforcement Officers, MBTA Enforcement
Policy (Mar. 7, 1996)). The United States Fish and Wildlife Service has refused to
enforce the MBTA against loggers even in publicized and egregious cases. Id. For
example, the agency refused to prosecute a private landowner that logged trees used
for nesting by Great Blue Herons, even though the harvest destroyed the entire active
rookery. Id. Even if the United States Fish and Wildlife Service refuses to exercise its
prosecutorial discretion, environmental groups can use the Administrative Procedures Act to challenge actions of federal agencies that violate the MBTA. See supra
note 86. However, environmental groups are powerless to enforce the MBTA on
private lands, which supply 94% of the U.S. timber supply. Alliance for the Wild
Rockies, supra note 149, at 5.
155. See United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 905 (2d Cir. 1978) (“As stated
in one of the early decisions under the Act, ‘an innocent technical violation on the
part of any defendant can be taken care of by the imposition of a small or nominal
fine.’”).
156. 16 U.S.C. § 704(a) (2006).
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Congress, however, the judiciary is unlikely to demand significant
changes in management of public lands. As such, Congress should
amend the MBTA to explicitly address the current threat that habitat
destruction poses to biodiversity.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss3/6

22

